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For Unto Us a Child Is Born-Legally
By George P. Smith II
Both courts and legislatures have
been loath to establish law in the
field of human artificial insemination.
As a result, the danger of criminal
prosecution and the uncertainties
of a legal vacuum face couples who
must turn to artificial insemination
to create a family. But the dark
corner may have been turned, for
one court decision and recent
statutes in two states offer hope.
ACCORDING to several authorities,the number of children born in
the United States through means of ar-
tificial insemination was approximately
100,000 in 1950. Yet today the esti-
mate is that more than 250,000 such
children live in the United States and
perhaps another 100,000 in the other
regions of the world.'
These figures are for children born
of heterologous insemination or A.I.D.
-which means, simply, they were
born as the direct result of semen
being secured from a third-party donor
and subsequently injected through a
syringe into their mother's reproduc-
tive tract. This procedure is necessi-
tated primarily because the married
woman's spouse is sterile. In some in-
stances, however, it is employed be-
cause of physiological (genital) im-
pediments, the desire to avoid the
transmission of undesirable inheritable
characteristics or the danger of im-
properly matched Rh blood factors.
The New York City Health Code
and regulations of the city's board of
health set rigid health standards that
any prospective donor must meet. The
donor is required to receive a complete
physical examination as well as a vene-
real disease test before he is accepted.
It even has been suggested that a ge-
neticist, as well as a physician, exam-
ine the donor to assure that no genetic
or other medical problem will arise.
Only a licensed medical doctor may le-
gally administer artificial insemina-
tion. No provisions legitimize the
offspring.
The opposite procedure to heterolo-
gous insemination is homologous inse-
mination or A.I.H. Here, a husband's
semen is taken and injected-by the
same process-into his wife's repro-
ductive organs. This is required most
often because of physiological or geni-
tal obstructions that prevent the hus-
band from completing the act of pro-




A recent Louis Harris opinion sur-
vey of the attitudes of 1,600 adults
throughout the country to multiple as-
pects of the "new" biology (i.e., artifi-
cial insemination) was both revealing
and startling. Nineteen per cent of
those interviewed approved of A.I.D.,
while 56 per cent disapproved of the
process. Where hetcrologous insemina-
tion (A.I.D.) was the only method for
a married couple to conceive a family,
35 per cent of those interviewed ap-
proved. Forty-nine per cent of the men
interviewed agreed in principle with
homologous insemination (A.I.H.), and
62 per cent of the women in the poll
stated their approval of allowing their




Whether a child born as a result of
artificial insemination is legitimate de-
pends on whether his mother's impreg-
nation did in fact constitute adultery.
If so, then the child is held to be illegi-
timate; but, if not, the offspring's legit-
imacy cannot be legally questioned. So,
adultery and illegitimacy are interre-
1. FINEGOLD, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION 58
(1964). See generally, Cowan, Moral Crea-
tivity in Science and the Law, 22 RUTGERS
L. REV. 446 (1968). But see, Burger, Reflec-
tions on Law and Experimental Medicine, 15
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 436 (1968), where it is
maintained that "it is not the role and func-
tion of the law to keep fully in pace with
science".
2. LIFE, June 13, 1969, at 52 et seq. See
generally, Smith, Through a Test Tube
Darkly: Artificial Insemination and the Law,
67 MIcri. L. REV. 127 (1968); Symposium,
Reflections on the New Biology, 15 U.C.L.A.
L. REV. 267 (1968).
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lated issues which go to form a single
question: Does a female who consents
to artificial insemination commit adul-
tery ?
The California Supreme Court re-
cently answered this question in the
negative in California v. Sorensen, 66
Cal. Rptr. 7, 437 P. 2d 495 (1968).
The court was considering a section of
the California Penal Code that pro-
vides aid to needy children but im-
poses a criminal sanction on a "father"
for failure to support a child. The
child in issue was born through
heterologous artificial insemination
(A.I.D.), and the mother named her
husband (Sorensen, the defendant in
the support case) as the father on the
birth certificate. For approximately
four years prior to the couple's separa-
tion, the defendant represented to his
friends that he was the child's father.
When they separated, Mrs. Sorensen
told the defendant that she wanted no
support for the child. Later, when the
divorce was granted, the court retained
jurisdiction on the issue of support for
the minor. When a subsequent illness
of Mrs. Sorensen necessitated public
assistance for the minor child, the dis-
trict attorney instituted this criminal
action alleging the defendant's guilt for
failure to support the child.
The court unanimously held that
the term "father" must be construed
broadly for purposes of the particular
statute under which the present action
was entertained; that the defendant
was the lawful father of the child born
to his former wife; that the child was
conceived by an artificial insemination
to which the defendant consented after
fifteen years of marriage and a medical
determination of his sterility; and that
his acceptance of the child carried with
it an obligation of support under perti-
nent California law.
The paternal role, the court ob-
served, could not be limited to a bio-
logical or natural father as those terms
generally are understood. Rather, in
analyzing such a role, emphasis should
be placed on the discovery of whether
a legal relationship of father and child
exists. Paternity, the court concluded, is
established beyond a reasonable doubt
when it is shown that a husband, un-
able to accomplish his parental objec-
tive of creating a child, purchases
semen from a donor and proceeds to
use it to inseminate his wife.
No valid public purpose, the court
held, was to be served by stigmatizing
an artifically conceived child as an ille-
gitimate. This classification does not
resolve the issue of the legal conse-
quences that flow from the acts of the
husband and wife. "Under our statute,
both legitimate and illegitimate minors
have a right to support from their par-
ents."
3. As to the complicated problems of in-
heritance, see Schuyler, The New Biology
and the Rule Against Perpetuities, 15
U.C.LA. L. REV. 420 41968).
The words of Justice Frankfurter, con-
curring in May v. Anderson, 345 U. S. 528,
536 (1952), are approriate to recall: "Chil-
dren have a very special place in life which
law should reflect. Legal theories and their
phrasing in other cases readily lead to falla.
cious reasoning if uncritically transferred to
determination of a State's duty towards
children."
Chief Judge Cardozo of the New York
Court of Appeals wrote on the issue of
legitimacy: "If husband and wife are living
together in the conjugal relation, legitimacy
will be presumed, though the wife has har-
bored an adulterer. ... It may even be pre-
sumed though the spouses are living apart
if there is a fair basis for the belief that at
The Wisdom
of Solomon
On the issue of adultery, the court
spoke with the wisdom of Solomon
when it held: "Since the doctor may be
a woman, or the husband himself may
administer the insemination by a syr-
inge this is patently absurd; to con-
sider it an act of adultery with the
donor who at the time of insemination
may be a thousand miles away or may
even be dead is equally absurd."
The California court was careful to
emphasize in its decision that it was
merely construing a provision in a
state statute and that the broad ques-
tions of legitimacy and succession
should be answered by the legislature.'
Limited though this decision may be, it
is nonetheless a significant break-
through in judicial reasoning.
Prior to the California Supreme
Court's decision in Sorensen, a ple-
thora of cases were uniform in their
holdings that artificial insemination,
homologous 4 or heterologous, 5 was un-
natural Ibad) and adulterous. Histori-
cally, adultery was condemned because
it tended to introduce spurious heirs
into a family, but more recently courts
have found that a necessary element of
adultery is the physical act of penetra-
tion by a male.6 Section 255.17 of the
New York Penal Law simply states
that "A person is guilty of adultery
when he engages in sexual intercourse
with another person at a time when he
has a living spouse, or the other person
has a living spouse." If penetration is
in fact the sole criterion of adultery,
then artificial insemination by a donor
times they may have come together." In re
Findlay, 253 N. Y. 1, 8, 170 N. E. 471, 473
(1930). See also, Segure v. Culley, 329 Ill.
458, 160 N. E. 847 (1928); Moore's Case,
294 Mass. 577, 3 N. E. 2d 5 (1936); Wic-
MORE, EVnEcE § 2527 (2d ed. 1940).
4. L. v. L., 1 All E. R. 141 (1949). The
statute of 14 Geo. VI c. 25, § 9 (1951),
abrogated the effect of this decision.
5. Orford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L. R. 15. 58
D.L.R. 251 (1921); Doornbos v. Doornbos,
23 LAw WEEK 2308 (Superior Court, Cook
County, Illinois, 1954) ; Hoch v. Hoch, TIME,
February 26, 1945, at 58 (case not officially
reported); Gurksy v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d
1083, 242 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
6. See Wisconsin v. Roberts, 169 Wis. 570,
173 N. W. 310 (1919); Iowa v. Hasty, 121
Iowa 507, 96 N. W. 1115 (1903i; Note,
Social and Legal Aspects of Human Arti-
ficial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 859.
cannot logically be held an act of adul-
tery.
The judicial attitude toward artifi-
cial insemination has been tied to a
rigid adherence to the principles of
stare decisis and an exceedingly nar-
row frame of reference. This has been
buttressed by the further belief that
this is an area more properly to be
considered by the legislature than the
courts. For instance, in the Gursky
case, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.
2d 406 fSup. Ct. 1948), the New York
court stated that this area was one into
which the legislature should have en-
tered, and since no statutory action
had been taken to legitimize A.I.D.
children, the court was unwilling to
take the initiative. But in Strnad v.
Strnad, 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S. 2d
390 (Sup. Ct. 1948), a New York
court held that a child born as a result
of A.I.D. was legitimate. In Strnad,
however, it should be noted that the
court was confronted with separation
proceedings involving custody of a
child conceived by means of A.I.D.
The defendant-husband had consented
to allow his wife to become insemi-
nated, and the court accordingly found
the defendant entitled to the same
rights of visitation as those acquired
by foster parents-arguing that, in es-




Instead of allowing law and science
to march boldly forward together, 7 the
courts and state legislative bodies have
responded by remaining passively
aloof, content to let the other act first.
The result has been a vacuum.
Oklahoma has answered the call for
sensible creativity and recently became
the first state to assume a definitive po-
sition by authorizing the use of A.I.D.
within the state and legitimizing chil-
dren born as a result of the consensual
use of this process.8 It appears from
the statute that an inseminated wife is
protected against subsequent allega-
tions of adultery that her consenting
husband might raise under this law.
No protection is afforded such a wife
who on her own initiative-submits
to heterologous insemination without
the consent of her husband.
Arkansas recently met the Oklahoma
pace half way by adopting a bold pro-
vision in its inheritance laws that
provides that any issue resulting from
an act of artificial insemination per-
formed on a married woman with the
consent of her husband will be treated
as the child of both spouses, with the
consent of the husband being presumed
unless clear and convincing evidence
shows a contrary intent.9
Attempts to legislate in this area at
A Child Is Born
the state level have failed consistently1"
-save the notable successes achieved
in Oklahoma and Arkansas. With the
progressive actions of a state judiciary
and two state legislative bodies thus
far, it can be hoped that a significant
beginning has been made and that
other states will become sensitive to
the legal problems raised by artificial
insemination and move to meet and re-
solve them. If others do not join in the
work to be done, definite progress will
never be achieved within this century,
which beckons to a brave and noble
new world.
The testing agents for resolving this
area of critical legal dubitation are
common sense and moral decency.
7. But see Chief Justice Burger's caveat
cited in note 1, supra.
8. OKLA. STAr. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-553
(Supp. 1967).
9. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-103(b) (Supp.
1969). See generally Wright, The New
Arkansas Inheritance Laws: A Step into the
Present with an Eye Toward the Future, 23
ARK. L. REV. 313 (1969).
10. See, e.g., N.Y. Senate Bill 745 (1948);
Virginia Senate Bill 199 (1948) ; Wisconsin
Assembly Bill 407 (1949) ; N.Y. Senate Bill
778 (1949) ; Indiana House Bill 350 (1949) ;
N.Y. Senate Bill 493 (1951). All of these
bills sought to legitimize A.I.D. children
born with the consent of the impregnated
woman's husband, and all were defeated. In
the 1969 session of the New York Assembly,
this writer tried-unsuccessfully-to intro-
duce similar legislation.
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